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Introduction
The title of the panel in which this paper is being presented is “Nationalism and its Others”,  
and in this context religion appears a priori as one such “Other”. In this paper, I would like to 
take  the  other  side  of  the  same  coin  –  which  is  the  question  of  the  relation  between 
nationalism and its others – and begin by considering what religion and nationalism have in 
common. In a recent article Rogers Brubaker discusses different approaches of the study of 
the relation between religion and nationalism. The first of these four approaches is precisely 
“the  strategy  of  treating  religion  and  nationalism  as  analogous  phenomena”  (Brubaker, 
2012:3). How should we consider an analogy between two complex things which we already 
formally,  terminologically,  contextually,  have predicated  as different? One could say it  is 
precisely  because  they  are  presented  to  us  as  different  that  we can  consider  the  relation 
between them. What Brubaker suggests is  connecting “both phenomenon to more general 
social structures and processes” and considering “religion and nationalism […] under more 
encompassing conceptual rubrics: as a mode of identification, a mode of social organization, 
and a way of framing political claims” (2012:4). With this in mind, I suggest defining religion 
and nationalism as sociohistorical imaginaries, and consider this basis as their formal relation. 
A sociohistorical imaginary is what institutes a given society and simultaneously provides the 
tools to interpret its reality (Castoriadis, 1997). 
In this paper, I first discuss aspects of the linguistic forms which is the prism from which I 
approach the relation between religion and nationalism. By considering the terms themselves, 
we can interpret elements of the inherited code, which is the English language. Substituting 
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signification to the Aristotelian category of substance, I make use of the associated categories 
of form and matter to elaborate on the relation between religion and nationalism. Considered 
as  necessarily  correlated,  these  categories  articulate  a  dynamics  between  language  and 
significations, which appears as the common modus operandi of religion and nationalism. I 
further discuss how their  significations  are negotiated sociohistorically,  instituting specific 
times and spaces, and corresponding temporal and spiritual institutions. The paper concludes 
on  the  historical  role  of  secularity  in  the  imaginary  distinction  between  religion  and 
nationalism. 
Elementary forms
Brubakers conceptual rubrics relate to the way Cornelius Castoriadis characterises the social 
imaginary, for “the imaginary of the society or of the period considered” is: 
"This element - which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which 
overdetermines  the  choice  and  the  connections  of  symbolic  networks,  which  is  the 
creation  of  each  historical  period,  its  singular  manner  of  living,  of  seeing  and  of  
conducting its own existence, its world, and its relations with this world, this originary 
structuring component, this central signifying signified, the source of that which presents  
itself  in  every  instance  as  an  indisputable  and  undisputed  meaning,  the  basis  for  
articulating what does matter and what does not, the origin of the surplus of being of the  
objects of practical, affective and intellectual investment, whether individual or collective 
[…]." (Castoriadis, 1997:243)
The social imaginary is a dynamics of grids of significations, hierarchies in the etymological 
sense, ordering and selecting what is pertinent (Castoriadis, 1986:465); what Brubaker terms 
“ontologies  and  structures  of  justification”  (2012:17).  Such significations  can  be  seen  as 
universal in the sense that we, as complex cultural animals, necessarily produce and reproduce 
such significations to make sense of and in reality. In De Anima, Aristotle examines the nature 
of the soul and elaborates his ontology of substance.1 Substance and soul can be equated as 
they both represent the cause and origin of existence (De Anima II.4, Hicks 1907:49), the 
reality  of  reality  so  to  say.  By  analogy,  paradigmatic  imaginary  significations  can  be 
considered the substance or the soul of a given culture. 
Aristotle presents three senses of substance: form, matter and the form-matter compound (De 
Anima II.1,  Hicks 1907:65).  The aim of the present  explanation  of  these categories  is  to 
provide  working  definitions  before  elaborating  on  the  relation  between  these  categories. 
Extracted  from  the  complexity  of  Aristotle’s  ontology,  they  appear  here  as  necessarily 
simplified. The distinction form-matter is one of the main categorical distinctions established 
1 The category of substance has many dimensions for Aristotle and is central  to his ontology.  The simplest  
working definition is to define substance as reality which could translate of the initial Greek term ousia (Cohen, 
2009:37). 
2
by Aristotle (Bernardt, 1979:109). The term “form” translates two different terms:  morphè 
and  eidos. The former designates the aspect of things, their superficial forms, whereas the 
latter,  which is  the one referred to in the form-matter  distinction,  refers to formal  reality, 
understood  as  the  rational  structure  of  reality  (Pellegrin  2009:48).  The  term  “matter” 
translates  hylè (“wood”), but as a concept,  it  is yet  not reducible to the physical,  material 
aspect of things. More generally,  matter designates what is subjected to change, what can 
potentially  take  form  and  lose  its  form  (Cohen,  2009b).  The  complex  relation  Aristotle 
elaborates between these categories is best summed up by the following exegesis: 
“Form may be accidental to the matter that it informs, but it is essential to the compound 
substance (i.e., the compound of matter and form) that it is the form of. Form is what  
makes the individual plants and animals what they are. Therefore, it is the substance of  
those individuals.” (Cohen, 2002) 
What this  suggests is  that  the relation between substance (signification),  form and matter 
operates as a kind of cycle. The logical nexus this relation creates shows us that the form of a 
substance is necessarily correlated to the latter, while matter may first appear of a secondary 
importance.  Nevertheless,  as  social  imaginaries  can  be  primarily  defined  as  instituting  a 
(cultural,  symbolical)  time  and  a  space,  the  framework  here  derives  fundamentally  from 
Aristotle’s perspective whereby substance is postulated as a universal. By instituting a space-
time,  the sociohistorical  imaginary institutes  form and matter  that  is  relative to  its  frame. 
While  a  signification  may well  be conceived  as  universal,  form and therefore  matter  are 
predicated from a given perspective.2 However complex, they are limited and limiting. As a 
relative  process,  formulation  necessarily  mirrors  materialisation,  or  there  would  be  no 
realisation. And while form determines or predicates matter, it is the conjunction/disjunction 
of the two which is significant. 
In the imaginary space-time, codetermination appears as defining the relation between form 
and matter appears codetermination of form and matter. The reason why Aristotle states form 
as the cause, the origin of the cycle, is because the formal dimension is the first conscious, 
rational, logical dimension of the social imaginary we apprehend. As form determines matter, 
matter is the second dimension, the dimension where experience is formed. And it is only 
through this dynamic codetermination, a speech-act so to say, that a sociohistorical sense can 
emerge  and  significations  be  instituted.  The  two  different  perspectives  are  nevertheless 
articulated together. The manner in which this is operated is through the formation of a code, 
a  language,  conceived in  time  as  the  repetition  of  the  formulation  of  experience  and the 
2 The question of perspective is fundamental in Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity which considers precisely 
space-time as a continuum.  
3
signification of forms.3 These different codes are our only means of communication within a 
cultural or imaginary space-time, as there is no social world outside language (in reference to 
Paul Ricœur, Langdridge, 2006:646). In short, we reach an understanding of the reality of this 
process  by  imagining  a  chronology,  a  hierarchy  of  forms.  And  again,  looking  from the 
perspective  of  the  signification,  rather  than  the  form  which  institutes  a  cultural  origin, 
Castoriadis  defines  the  concept  of  signification  as  “an  indefinite  skein  of  interminable 
referrals to something other than (than what would appear to be stated directly)” (1997:253). 
These  referrals  are  the  forms  used in  the different  languages  (linguistic,  but  also  artistic, 
physical, sensual, etc.) and the experiences tied to them. Castoriadis then points to the central 
role of language:  
“These other things can be both significations and non-significations – that  to which 
significations relate or refer.  The lexicon of the significations of a language does not 
revolve around itself, is not closed in upon itself, as has flatly been stated. What is closed 
in upon itself, fictively, is the code, the lexicon of ensemblist-identitary signifieds, each  
of which can take on one or more sufficient definitions. But the lexicon of significations 
is  always  open;  for the full  signification of a word is everything that  can be socially 
stated, thought, represented or done on the basis of this word.” (1997:253)
The phrase “the full signification of a word” reduces language down to linguistic language. 
The reason Castoriadis exemplifies  the relation between signification and language in this 
way is because linguistic language is considered language par excellence. On the other hand 
this reduction opens up a complexity, which already appears formally in the definition that 
follows the reductive statement: “everything that can be socially stated, thought, represented 
or done.” The situation may still appear as paradoxical: in general, words (or signs) allow us 
to give form, to formulate, to predicate our reality;  and in particular, they inform, encrypt, 
make this reality more complex. This disjunction is only resolved on a higher level, through a 
process also involving the dimension of conjunction.
One might  wonder  here  how a  categorisation  Aristotle  applies  to  plants  or  animals,  also 
applies to the much more abstract significations we are concerned with, those of religion and 
nationalism. But even if a form is considered necessary in its relation to a signification, the 
actual form of a signification is accidental: on the higher level we mention above, matter is 
form  and  vice  versa.  The  interrogation  is  therefore  epistemological  and  should  thus  be 
rephrased as follows: how does the process of signification which applies to forms which 
matter in the natural world, applies to those which matter in the cultural world?
3 The repetition of these processes is accompanied by other processes: the memorisation and transmission of the  
forms. 
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Forms of matter 
By  considering  religion  and  nationalism  as  sociohistorical  imaginaries,  religion  and 
nationalism are conceived as forms relative to the paradigmatic significations that they are the 
forms of. This infers in return that the signification to which these forms are relative to are 
restricted by the sociohistorical matter framed in the imaginary space-time continuum. So the 
first reason this categorisation applies is because religion and nationalism are tied to social 
experiences,  or rather they are social  experiences.  I  have started by defining religion and 
nationalism as social imaginaries suggesting the potential analogy between the two concepts. 
If we look up their respective definitions in the Oxford Dictionary, the definitions we find are 
fairly  abstract.  The  first  entries  of  the  definitions  of  religion  and  nationalism  read, 
respectively:  “the  belief  in  and worship  of  a  superhuman  controlling  power,  especially  a 
personal  God or  gods” and “patriotic  feeling,  principles,  or  efforts”  (Oxford Dictionaries  
Online,  ODO,  2010).  The  primary  sense  in  which  they  are  abstract  is  because  neither 
definitions provide a (particular) when nor where. At first sight, they are each conceived as 
equal to themselves, as identical, in time and space.4 And yet, both words are themselves, as 
linguistic formations, set in a given frame. In the case of religion, for instance, the last entry 
on the “origin” of the word in the Oxford Dictionary reads: “Middle English (originally in the 
sense 'life  under monastic  vows'):  from Old French,  or from Latin  religio(n-)  'obligation, 
bond, reverence', perhaps based on Latin religare 'to bind'”. The first information places the 
term in its original time frame of Middle English: a period between the 11th and 15th centuries 
(which corresponds to the High and Late Middle Ages), in a corner of the world loosely 
referred to as England. Although in brackets, the second information is perhaps just as much 
important.  The  original  meaning,  “life  under  monastic  vows”,  greatly  restricts  the 
signification of the term religion compared to the contemporary sense provided by the first 
entry of the definition. The evolution of the same form, meaning a precise hierarchical and 
normative  relation  with  the  institution  of  the  Church,  to  the  contemporary  meaning 
encompassing all cultural  relations to a God figure comes under the poetic or metaphoric 
aspect of language (Ricœur, 2003). In this particular case, this translation can be described as 
a transhistorical synecdoche.  
The image of the initial signification of religion refers to the regular clergy, those members of 
the Church of Rome who follow, literally,  the  rules of a religious order. Traditionally,  the 
regular  clergy  is  contrasted  with  the  secular  clergy,  which  means  those  members  of  the 
4 We  could  elaborate  further  on  the  similarities  between  the  two  definitions.  E.g.  each  of  them  describes 
experiences which in relation to a particular external figure: God or patrie (literally, fatherland), etc.   
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Church who live “in the world” (ODO, 2010). In the Middle Ages, the world of the secular 
clergy of  the Church of Rome is  medieval  Europe.  Described as  feudal,5 the societies  of 
medieval Europe themselves are described as organised according to a set of cultural rules, 
and are therefore societies of order.6 In addition, the contemporary sense of the term secular, 
from which the concept of secularity referred to in this paper derives, appears as also resulting 
from a transhistorical synecdoche of a similar nature as the term religion, where a part is used 
to describe the whole.7 
A synecdoche is a common figure of speech, a particular type of metaphor,  were a part is 
substituted for the whole or the whole for a part. Contrary to other common figures of speech,  
such as comparisons, metaphors do not present a semiotic sign which signifies the process of 
analogy or substitution.8 But most importantly, although certain metaphors have become worn 
out,  in  the  The  Rule  of  Metaphor,  Paul  Ricœur  shows  how  meaning  is  produced  and 
reproduced across levels and categories of discourse through the living power of the metaphor 
as  “the  conjunction  of  fiction  and redescription” (Ricœur,  2003:291).  The process  of  the 
“metaphoricity of metaphors” thus corresponds to the creation of social significations. The 
fictional  aspect  of  metaphors  relates  to  the  way human beings  experience reality:  as  this 
reality is elusive,  fictional elements are necessary to organise it  in the  form of narratives. 
Redescription refines the notion of identity:  a metaphor is not simply the copy of what it 
refers to; it is a transfer of the same to the other (in time, in form, etc.).
History  is  always  taken  in  medias  res,  which  means  that  in  matter,  continuity  and 
discontinuity  are  always  interrelated.  Once sociohistorical  matter  is  predicated  by a  form 
(through redefinition, reformulation, translation, etc.) it has the potential to become real, to be 
imagined as real, and concurrently, because it becomes transmittable, it becomes social. The 
languages  we  use  have  been  transformed  semantically,  grammatically  and  graphically. 
5 For specialists, Feudalism is a debated concept. While indeed the Middle Ages present us with feudal societies,  
feudalism, as a social organising principle, is not a particularity of the Middle Ages. 
6 I am using this expression in a literal sense, and not in reference to the debate between society of order and 
society of class. A society of class is in fact, in our context, a society of order. The continuities as well as the  
discontinuities between pre-industrial societies described as societies of order and industrial societies of class 
oversimplify the  complexities  and  the  qualities  of  social  significations  in  the  transition  between  these  two 
models. 
7 A determining period for the transformation of terms was certainly, as Eric Hobsbawm points out for the terms  
used to describe society, the “age of the dual revolution” (Hobsbawm, 1996). Such is the case for order and class  
mentioned in the previous note.
8 The synecdoche is related to another type of metaphor, the metonymy which operates a transfer either from a  
whole entity to one of its attributes (as in metonymy; 'the blue' standing for 'the sky') or vice versa. Synecdoches  
are  frequent  in  political  and  media  discourses:  names  of  states  are  regularly substituted  for  the  names  of 
governments, political representatives or sports teams. Conversely, the names of capital cities often replace the 
names of government representatives, or, if this particular illustration is considered a metonymy, it transfers the  
meaning of a political or economic institution situated in the city to the name of the city itself.  
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Writing itself fixates forms for posterity; it is therefore not fortuitous that the invention of the 
printing machine also participated in the homogenisation of languages and their formation 
into national languages (Anderson, 1983). Ricœur argues that language is in fact part of the 
process  of  experiencing  human  reality  because  of  what  he  terms  the  expressibility  of 
experience: “To bring [experience] into language is not to change it into something else, but, 
in  articulating  and  developing  it,  to  make  it  become  itself”  (1981:115).  On  a 
phenomenological  level,  matter  also  determines  form:  its  indeterminacy  renders  its 
reformulation  necessary  for  its  human,  social  reality.  In  time  and  space,  this  means  that 
formulations  do  not  necessarily  correspond  to  the  socio-historical  matter  they  describe. 
Indeed, our experience of things always appears to us as a tension between similarity and 
difference. Our modern perception of experience realigns and fixates form and matter in time; 
perhaps for reasons of clarity, but also partly because we have cultural tendency to perceive 
things in a linear fashion, and because it essentially is an ideological perspective on things.9 In 
this  particular  instance  it  is  a  perspective  on  history,  a  view of  history,  which  processes 
historical  material  into  linear,  positivist  narratives.  And  such  linearity  is  one  of  the 
characteristics  of  national  historiography,  thought  and developed  from the  perspective  of 
positivism (Geary, 2002). But nationalist historiography would not come into being before the 
nineteenth century, in the secular universities of Europe (and by extension, in the rest of the 
world), and genealogical linearity is not exclusive to nationalist narratives. Of course, most 
narratives are indeed linear,  the traditional form is chronological  as the various narratives 
found  in  the  Bible  illustrate.  Both  cases,  of  national  historiography  and  in  the  biblical 
narratives, are representative of significations of authority,  providing myths that found the 
spaces and the times to be reproduced in their sociohistorical realization.10  
The two imaginaries of religion and nationalism are thus analogous as far as they determine 
matter in a linear way. And yet, they appear as different on many other levels. Formally of 
course, but more fundamentally on the level of the actual spaces and times were and when 
they operate these determinations. In European history, the frames they institute are different: 
most  national  histories  set  the  origins  of  their  nation  in  the  early  medieval  ages  –  the 
dimension of the time of nations is a much shorter time span that is instituted by the book of 
Genesis; furthermore, the space of nations is a usually clearly defined and fixed territory, the 
9 It could be one of the imaginary responses to the chaos of every-day life, where experience takes place without 
our possibility to mediate it through a formulation. Immediate experience is the experience of chaos. It could be 
interesting to discuss this in the light of the acceleration of time.
10 The now global seven days week further illustrates how such frames can be extracted from their original  
justification.   
7
homeland. A priori, this space-time does not challenge the space-time of biblical creation. In 
other words, the incipit of nationalist significations (the origins) is not as paradigmatic as that 
of religious significations (the creation). An illustration on how this is significant is that there 
are  no  national  ideologies  which  promote  a  different  calendar  for  instance,  a  different 
organization  of  the  week  in  seven  days,  etc.  Indeed,  after  being  reproduced  by  national 
cultures, this has now logically become part of a contemporary global culture. Challenging 
our  calendar  may  seem  absurd,  partly  because  it  is  reproduced  across  the  globe  as  the 
international  calendar,  and  more  significantly  because  we  believe  that  its  basic  form 
corresponds to the most natural. And yet, even within Christianity, the topic has been much 
debated, and different branches still do not have identical calendars. And a calendar, is a form 
which predicates natural cycles, it is not a natural signification. More precisely, it is a cultural 
paradigmatic signification, of the measuring and remembering of human time, that has been 
negotiated throughout history and across cultural spaces.11 
Sociohistorical significations 
The  contemporary  secularized  form  of  the  Gregorian  calendar  predicates  our  global 
contemporary time scale, but it also signifies the transformation, or translation of its historical 
forms. The different forms are negotiated against other forms, which are sometimes forgotten 
and  generally  considered  obsolete,  or  primitive.  Nevertheless  they  are  part  of  what  their 
relations, their relative negotiations result in: a form of forms, a transhistorical signification. 
Nationalism can be considered to be secular in the sense that it does not challenge a certain 
number of “regular” paradigmatic significations of religion, as illustrated in the present case 
with Christianity. Nationalism negotiates relative spaces between such significations to exert 
its own cultural hegemony. Moreover, as suggested in the above illustration, cultural forms 
correspond  to  sociohistorical  experiences.  The  illustration  also  presents  how  forms  are 
signified  through  other  forms  in  relative  dimensions.  Geopolitical  institutions  are  such 
discursive  forms.  Indeed,  they  signify  a  certain  spatial  imaginary.  For  example,  national 
institutions  and national  territories  (and histories  and languages)  are  ideally  tied together. 
Similarly,  religious  institutions  are  also  ideally  tied  to  the  elements  of  the  world  they 
formulate.  The  ideal  being  what  the  institutions  tend  to,  what  they  promote,  what  their 
positions are, and not simply the representation of an a-temporal universal. The ideal thus 
defines the interests of the corresponding institution and justifies the experience. 
11 In relation to the acceleration of time, we could add that the rationalisation of time, in hours, seconds and 
more, has reduced the sequences at which we experience time. This could partly explain how the acceleration of  
time is being experienced. 
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While negotiations surrounding our calendar time scale appear to be relatively stale lately, 
negotiations surrounding our political institutions within this time scale occupy a generally 
more turbulent space. While nationalism writes linear and coherent national stories, the story 
of  nationalism follows a formally more  chaotic  history.  The period of  transition between 
medieval  institutions  and  modern  institutions  has  been  determining  for  the  formation  of 
nationalism  (Brubakers,  2012:6).  In  other  words,  different  stages  in  the  negotiations  for 
cultural power between state institutions and the institutions of the Church of Rome have in 
time and in space made nationalism, the ideal of nationalism, possible. It is not fortuitous that 
this transition relates to linguistic transitions as well. Middle English is an expression that 
does not capture the depth of the its history. From a subaltern group of languages and dialects, 
one particular  version of  Middle English was renegotiated  as  a  political  and legal  (albeit 
chiefly oral)  language in the transition between the High and Late Middle Ages (Crystal,  
2004). The high point of this transition on the part of political institution is the  Pleading in 
English Act (or Statute of Pleading) of 1362 under the reign of Edward  III.  It is certainly 
significant that this occurred during the reign of Edward III who was the king who initiated 
the Hundred Years War for the crown of the kingdom of France.  The decline  of Anglo-
Norman,  or  Norman  French,  is  thus  concurrent  to  the  political  recognition  of  an English 
language during a major political and military struggle between two feudal states.12 And yet, 
this foundational stage in the becoming of the English language into a national language is not 
the result of a nationalist ideology: as the original text of the Act (written in the Legal French 
of the period) reads, it is rather in terms of usage, or customs, that the act is justified.13 At the 
same time,  we have  to  recognise  how such developments  have  participated  in  informing 
(although perhaps a priori in an arbitrary way) modern significations of people, of popular 
sovereignty,  and of course of standardised languages,  all participating at their level to the 
gestation of national imaginaries.   
At a later stage, another high point in the “magmatic” evolution of the English language has 
certainly  been  the  Reformation  which  presents  us  with  more  substantial  elements  of  the 
Church  and  state,  but  also  with  elements  of  more  fundamental  “cosmological”,  changes 
(Szporluk 1988:86): it presents us with the conjunction of challenges against the doctrines but 
also against the hierarchies of power associated with it. 14 The reformation in the Kingdom of 
England was a process which originated under the rule of king Henry VIII, who was instituted 
12 The  Hundred  Years  War  also  corresponds  to  the  actual  end  of  the  crusades  which  had  signified  the 
consolidation of the Christian commonwealth. 
13 A reproduction  of  the  statute  alongside  a  modern  English  translation  can  be  accessed  on  the  following 
webpage: http://www.languageandlaw.org/texts/stats/pleading.htm.
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supreme  head  of  the  newly  formed  Church  of  England,  effectively  –  but  not  entirely 
dogmatically  –  separating  it  from  the  Holy  Roman  Catholic  Church  by  a  series  of 
Parliamentary acts in the 1530s (Pendrill, 2000:88-94; see also Jones, 2002). The Protestant 
reformation which was gaining momentum in mainland Europe exerted great influence on the 
process of the English reformation, but it was not until Elizabeth I's accession to the throne 
that protestant dogmas became dominant. 
The theological principle of the sola scriptura (“by scripture alone”) was the ultimate principle 
in protestant theology vindicated in the Reformation. It is a formal principle which establishes 
the Bible as the only source of legitimate authority (McGarth, 2007:59).15 One of the main 
consequences is the depreciation of the other sources of power: the clergy and tradition. Their 
successful  discursive  deprecation  has  resulted,  in  time,  in  the  relativisation  of  their 
signification.  Another consequence is the promotion of a less restricted access to the Bible, 
which entailed the development of popular, vernacular versions of the Bible.16  
The cosmos which was promoted through the Reformation was radically different from the 
then  traditional  order  which  established  the  Holy  See  as  a  central  authority  in  medieval 
Europe.17 In consequence, papal power and its signification(s) diminished in pace with the 
spread of the Reformation across Europe. The new order was finally settled in 1648 with the 
signing of the Peace of Westphalia treaties, which put an end to the religious violence and 
wars which had torn Europe during the many preceding decades. The most relevant element 
in regards to the Peace of Westphalia is that it established the recognition of state sovereignty, 
signifying a new form of sovereignty. The recognition of the absolute sovereignty of states, de 
facto and de jure, effectively disintegrated the significance of the papal power of recognition 
of kingship in favour of power of the kings and princes of Europe (Straumann, 2008; Suter, 
2006). 
14 There were other radical innuendos of imaginary change in the catholic space, notably in the cosmopolitanism 
and humanism of theologians and scholars such as Michel de Montaigne, Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus and 
Thomas More, which were the first “beams” of the Enlightenment period and constitute the beginning of what is  
called the “Republic of Letters”.
15 The second general category in Christian theology being tradition, or “material principles”.  
16 At first, Henry VIII was opposed to the introduction of an English translation of the Bible. Eventually, the  
Tyndale Bible translation, even if incomplete, would be the first to benefit from printing and will be considered 
17 In continuity of the already authoritative symbol of the city of Rome. The conversion of Frankish king Clovis 
in the fifth century A.D. effectively established the medieval power association between Rome and European 
states carried out through the clergy which answered both to their respective monarchs and to the Pope. This  
association was further expressed in the papal recognitions of kingship which can be assimilated to the symbolic  
act of incarnation, establishing the “divine right” of the kings. The first such explicit recognition took place on 
behalf of Frankish king Pippin in 757. At the same time, the king also decreed the first legal settlement of the 
question of the temporal power of the Papacy (see Sæbø, 2000).
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What these readjustments and mutations signify is the modification of the social order: the 
secular clergy was loosing its prime position. Without being entirely relativised,  the Early 
Modern period in Europe is marked by the mutlidimensional negotiations which the demoting 
of the political cum cultural power of the Church of Rome represents. This was of course no 
sudden  change.  This  power  had  already  been  severely  hampered  in  the  century  which 
separated  the  early  stages  of  the  Reformation  and  the  Peace  of  Westphalia.  The  well 
established divine right of kings was one of the elements which would justify the instituting of 
King Henry VIII as supreme head of the Church of England. This signified that the king was 
recognised as being invested with kingly power directly by the form which represented the 
ultimate and primary signification: the figure of God.18 By the time the Peace of Westphalia 
was being negotiated, this signification had informed all the European heads of state (Blin, 
2006:56).19 
Conclusion
I have briefly examined fragments of the political and ideological contestation of the medieval 
order, primarily the relation between the Church of Rome and the Kingdom of England to 
illustrate  the  multidimensional  relations  between  religion,  nationalism  and  by  extension 
secularity.  It  is  in  the  transitions  between  significations  that  spaces  of  negotiations  are 
formulated. Although nationalism, as a doctrine, will not be formulated before late modernity, 
it is during this transition from feudal to modern society that many of the significations which 
would recompose into nationalism have been instituted.
This brief examination has been set in a framework based on categories of form and matter. A 
form is an authority when it establishes a hierarchy of the forms that inform it. The way it 
establishes such a hierarchy is determined by sociohistorical matter, that is, in time and space. 
An authoritative  form is  thus  a  performative  cultural  discourse,  in  a  similar  way certain 
utterances are speech-acts (Austin, 1962). But this is not inherent to the form, if there is no 
sociohistorical  matter  from  which  we  can  abstract  reproducing  forms;  if  there  is  no 
experience,  there  is  no  performance.  A  form  can  be  described  as  authoritative  only  a 
posteriori,  that  is  after  the  phenomenological  experience  which  will  justify  its  position, 
regardless whether the form was already formulated or inherited (reproduction and distortion 
18 This was also supported by the notions of kinship and blood which had been of particular significance to the  
nobles of Europe since long before.  
19 Looking Western Schism and its origins, we get a deeper and longer sense of the negotiations of political or  
institutional power between Kings and Popes, and indeed between Popes as well. In the historical  novel by 
Maurice Druon, The Accursed Kings, the thought of a cardinal expresses the double face (temporal and spiritual)  
position of the head of the Church of Rome: “Being a priest is not enough to become Pope; one also has to know 
how to be a prince.” (personal translation, Druon, 1977:19). 
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of an instituted signification) or whether it is a new form. We cannot access the experience of 
others,  and reality  in  general,  without  languages,  linguistic  or otherwise.  Furthermore,  all 
languages are elaborated on the basis of imaginary forms through an elaborate and repetitive 
process  of  symbolling  (the  act  of  adding  meaning).  In  order  to  create  such  an  access, 
formulation becomes a necessity; in order to maintain this access (and to refrain from opening 
other accesses), reformulation becomes a necessity: as is suggested in the ODO definition, the 
word religion was redefined through reformulation, that is, with other forms used to add and 
eventually change the meaning of the term, refining the form and its meaning into the fixed 
and abstract signification we use today. 
This theoretical elaboration thus appears to be a sort of détournement (Debord, 1970: §204-
209), a hijacking of Aristotelean ontological categories for the purposes of an epistemological 
reflection for the study of the relation between religion and nationalism as social imaginaries. 
The aim was less a demonstration and rather the formulation of epistemological interrogations 
for the study of religion and nationalism, and by extension secularity.  Indeed, this reflection 
leads to many interrogations for further inquiry into the signification of nationalism, which 
does not appear as fundamental as religion and its instituting of a world, but rather as the 
endeavour, the justification for modern institutions and social groups to define a certain place 
within this world. The dimensions signified in religious and national narratives and histories, 
albeit performed from different space-time perspectives, raises the question of the extent to 
which  nationalist  histories,  at  least  in  the  European  context,  is  a  reformulation  of  the 
historiographical narratives of the Old Testament and, on a mythical level, represent versions 
or adaptations of how other peoples than the initial  chosen people can themselves have a 
shared sense of uniqueness.20 
What of the concept and signification of secularity? As it derives from religious discourse, the 
signification of the term appears as more ambivalent as simply that which is not religious. In 
consequence, and bearing in mind the implicit idea that religion and nationalism follow an 
analoguous modus operandi, the interrogation of their relation is indeed the interrogation of 
the signification of secularity. The question could be formulated as follows: do secular rules 
follow a substantially different process of signification than “regular” rules? This further leads 
20 There are numerous elements  across  different  nationalisms which illustrate  this:  the expression “manifest 
destiny” in American nationalism is perhaps one of the most obvious illustration. On another note, the age-old 
and widespread antisemistism also suggests how a cultural, cosmological complex of inferiority has been central 
in European cultures (although not exclusively), leading in the age of nationalism to the most extreme form of  
exclusion. The Nazi regime is the obvious high point of this evolution, but it would be simplistic to ascribe such  
motives to the national-socialism and other emergences of fascism alone. 
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to questioning how radical and revolutionary modernity actually is if we take into account the 
long  historical  moment  within  which  modernity,  with  nationalism,  occurs.  The  extent  to 
which nationalism profoundly opposes traditional religious frameworks is debatable, contrary 
for  instance  to  elements  of  the  development  of  the  scientific  method.  To  conclude  on  a 
contemporary  note,  what  is  the  signification  in  contemporary  political  discourse,  where 
“revolutions” – a scientific term – are deprecated in favour of more consensual “reforms” – a 
religious term? 
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